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Abstract 
The term "general aviation" accounts for all civilian flights that are not scheduled 
(or chartered) passenger airlines. Loss of control incidents in flight are the primary cause 
of fatal general aviation accidents. By definition, a loss of control event is a preventable 
occurrence where a pilot should have maintained or regained control of their aircraft. 
Giving a pilot sufficient warning to correct dangerous situations is crucial in preventing 
loss of control. Existing warning methods are based on physical margins of aircraft 
limitations and do not directly consider how much time is left to act before loss of 
control. This research focuses on the development of a method that uses real-time inertial 
and aerodynamic data to calculate and improve warnings of flight envelope limitations. 
X-Plane 10, a realistic flight simulator, was used to simulate the flight of a Cessna 172, a 
common general aviation aircraft. The flight model of X-Plane has been compared to 
empirical data with favorable results, indicating X-Plane is a reasonable platform on 
which to investigate an active warning system. The development of an X-Plane software 
plugin for a constant-time warning system method is discussed in detail. The plugin 
utilizes aircraft and flight model data from X-Plane to consider proximity to a potential 
loss of control event before issuing a warning. When configured to warn the pilot 2.2 
seconds before loss of control, coefficient of lift based methods showed up to an 
additional 1.1 seconds of margin when compared to traditional stall warning methods and 
an overall stall warning margin of approximately 2 seconds. With careful consideration 
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of the physical state of the aircraft, the system is meant to give the pilot at least 2 or 3 
seconds to correctly react to a dangerous situation. This type of "constant-time" warning 
is a novel approach to preventing loss of control and offers distinct advantages over more 
traditional methods, which can leave pilots with very little time to react. The method 
demonstrated can use visual and aural warnings and can be modified to adjust its time 
warning margin based on the potential for fatal loss of control. Such a system could be 
integrated into current general aviation aircraft using digital cockpit hardware or a 
standalone electronic box. The proof-of-concept created for this warning technique opens 
possibilities of more capable yet less costly loss of control mitigation systems that have 
the potential to greatly reduce general aviation fatalities. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
The term "general aviation" (GA) accounts for all civilian flights that are not 
scheduled (or chartered) passenger airlines. General aviation aircraft tally more than 90% 
of the registered aircraft in the United States [1]. Agriculture, law enforcement, personal 
flying, land surveying, medical services, skydiving, and flight training are just a few 
examples of what falls under general aviation flying. Of all general aviation flights, an 
estimated 65% are for business and public services [1]. The other third of GA flights are 
for personal flying, which might include visiting family or friends, flying for pleasure, 
flying to reach a vacation destination, or flying for proficiency. While personal flying 
only accounts for one-third of GA flying, it accounts for two-thirds of GA accidents [2].  
1.1.1 General Aviation Accidents Overview 
More than 65% of accidents in general aviation throughout 2012 occurred during 
personal flying operations [2]. Table 1 on the following page gives an overview of GA 
accidents that occurred in 2012. The numbers are broken down by the purpose of flight. 
For the complete table, see Table A-1 in Appendix A.  
While personal flying only accounts for about one-third of all GA flights, 
approximately 73% of GA fatalities from 2003-2012 occurred during personal use [2]. 
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For this reason, the focus of the present research is turned toward safety of personal 
flying in general aviation.  
 
Table 1: General aviation accidents from 2012 NTSB data [2] 
General	  Aviation	  Accident	  Aircraft	  by	  Flight	  Purpose,	  2012	  
Purpose	  of	  Flight	   Total	  Accidents	   Percent	  of	  Total	  
Personal	   988	   66.40%	  
Instructional	   208	   14.00%	  
Aerial	  Application	   67	   4.50%	  
Business	   31	   2.10%	  
All	  Other	   193	   13.00%	  
Total	   1487	   100%	  
 
 
Figure 1 below indicates a decline in personal flying hours over the past decade. 
The exact cause of this decline, while beyond the scope of this work, might be attributed 
to increasing costs of flying or perhaps the declining pilot population.  
 
Figure 1: Personal flying hours data from 2012 analysis [2]  
While there is no denying that personal flying hours have gone down in the past 
decade, Figure 2 on the following page makes it clear that the accident rate has actually 
stayed relatively stagnant or even slightly increased over the same period. 
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Figure 2: Personal flying accident rates, 2003-2012 [2] 
 
With stagnant accident rates in personal flying, it is important to understand what is 
causing so many accidents and their resulting fatalities. 
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Loss of control inflight (LoC) generally occurs when an aircraft enters a flight 
condition that exceeds the normal realm of flight operations, known as the flight 
envelope. According to Rich Stowell (MCFI-A), LoC accidents result from "situations in 
which a pilot should have maintained or regained control of the aircraft, but did not" [3]. 
Cockpit distractions, lack of situational awareness, or mishandling of the aircraft can 
contribute to an LoC event. In these situations, inappropriate (or lack of) flight control 
inputs can quickly result in a deadly stall or spin. LoC incidents are the primary cause of 
fatal general aviation accidents [2].  
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flying. During an accident investigation, the NTSB attempts to identify a defining event 
(or primary cause) of the accident. The number of accidents for a defining event, both 
fatal and non-fatal, is organized in descending order of frequency. As shown for calendar 
year 2012, LoC inflight situations accounted for 20% of all accidents. Out of 203 fatal 
GA personal flying accidents in 2012, 92 (45%) were primarily caused by Loss of 
Control inflight [2]. For the complete list of defining events, see Figure A-1 in Appendix 
A.  
 
Figure 3: NTSB defining event data for 2012 GA personal flying accidents [2] 
 
There are 26 defining events used by the NTSB (including unknown or 
undetermined), but just one type – Loss of Control inflight – accounts for nearly half of 
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personal flying, it is important to understand what might cause an inflight loss of control 
and what is currently being done to prevent these situations. 
1.1.3 Loss of Control Events: Causes and Human Factors 
 Generally speaking, departing from controlled flight involves exceeding the flight 
envelope of the aircraft. A flight envelope describes the capability of the aircraft in terms 
of airspeed, altitude, and load factor. Flying outside the envelope may result in 
aerodynamic stalls, physical damage to the aircraft, aerodynamic spins, and even 
unrecoverable loss of control. In the discussed LoC events, it is assumed that control 
either should have been maintained by the pilot or regained after it was lost [3]. This 
presumption usually excludes events in which control was lost due to some sort of 
abnormal failure or event (e.g. major wing damage due to weather). Essentially, if the 
pilot keeps the aircraft within the envelope, control should be maintained.  
 Several reasons could result in a pilot directing an aircraft out of (or failing to 
keep it within) its accepted flight envelope. For example, if an instrument in the cockpit 
(e.g. airspeed indicator) fails, a pilot may be reasonably expected to recognize, 
troubleshoot, and correct or find alternative solutions for the issue. If the pilot is unable to 
correct the issue and loses control of the aircraft, this can be considered an LoC event 
where the pilot should have maintained control. Another common flight environment 
where LoC is likely to occur is on approach for landing, where a pilot’s workload for the 
tasks at hand can be very high. If the pilot is distracted and lets airspeed drop, or enters a 
highly banked turn with low airspeed, the low-altitude event can quickly turn into a fatal 
loss of control. In both of these examples, a pilot would have reasonably been expected to 
maintain control of his aircraft, as required training exists for instrument failures and 
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challenging landings. In an LoC situation, appropriate flight control inputs can determine 
whether a pilot maintains or loses control of the aircraft. There are plenty of scenarios 
that could lead to a preventable loss of control, but many have one thing in common: a 
lack of situational awareness. 
Situational Awareness (SA) is what allows a pilot to respond appropriately to the 
conditions in flight. A pilot must be able to recognize key events, understand the meaning 
of the events, and predict future consequences of control inputs. As Daryl Smith says, 
"The pilot who sees the change, understands the change, and is able to project what this 
means for [the] aircraft has high situational awareness" [4]. With high SA, a pilot can 
determine the correct actions to take before an LoC event turns into an accident. 
Maintaining a high level of SA is imperative for a pilot to operate an aircraft 
safely. Greater training can result in higher levels of SA and result in fewer accidents [5], 
but occasionally high workloads can overwhelm even seasoned pilots. If a task’s 
requirements exceed the pilot’s capabilities, it may be completely neglected or not done 
properly [6]. Perhaps even worse, a pilot with great abilities may become overconfident 
and complacent while operating an aircraft. Complacency, referred to as "probably the 
deadliest of the flying sins" by Richard Collins [5], can put overconfident pilots in 
unrecoverable operations. To break the loop and ensure pilots are able to recognize 
potentially dangerous changes in flight conditions, methods to improve SA and 
compensate for complacency have been implemented throughout aviation’s history.  
1.2 Current Methods of Prevention 
There are several methods, regulations, and aftermarket systems that can aid in 
preventing LoC events. One method of LoC prevention is the use of a pilot’s operating 
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handbook (POH) for an aircraft, which is a passive defense for LoC incidents. Ideally, 
through the POH, a pilot is aware of the flight envelope and limitations of the aircraft and 
can estimate the aircraft’s position in the flight envelope using cockpit instrument data. 
However, in high workload situations, such as approaching a runway to land, pilots 
continually scan for traffic, communicate with air traffic control, adjust the aircraft’s 
configuration, and are generally less able to pay close attention to instruments in the 
cockpit. Relying solely on visual instrumentation that indicates proximity to a potential 
LoC event only increases the pilot’s visual scanning and mental workload. Additionally, 
recalling data from the POH to apply in flight is difficult and mentally inefficient. As a 
result, aural and visual stall warnings were developed to alert a pilot who has lost focus 
on the aircraft’s flight regime and is nearing aerodynamic stall (i.e. sudden loss of lift). 
To prevent LoC due to aerodynamic stall or spin, Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs) require all certified small aircraft to have a 5-knot margin stall warning in wings-
level flight [7]. For other specified stalls, a warning is required to give the pilot enough 
time to react and regain control of the aircraft. However, continued LoC incidents 
indicate these minimum requirements may offer insufficient warnings for pilots to correct 
rapidly changing situations that have small safety margins, such as turning the aircraft on 
final approach to a runway. Additionally, experimental or amateur-built aircraft do not 
have stall warning standards and may not possess any stall warning method, increasing 
the potential for an LoC event. 
Similar to traditional stall warnings, angle of attack indicators warn a pilot when 
their aircraft is reaching an excessive angle of attack. These indicators are often graphical 
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and aural in nature. An example indicator from Advanced Flight Systems, Inc. [8] is 
shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4: Angle of attack indicator from Advanced Flight Systems, Inc. [8] (Used with permission) 
 
The green, yellow, and red lights on the indicator tell a pilot whether or not his aircraft’s 
angle of attack is dangerously high. These indicators are being pushed by the general 
aviation community for implementation into existing aircraft. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) has also recently endorsed their installation as an LoC prevention 
measure [9]. Unfortunately, if a pilot possesses low situational awareness, these devices 
do not offer much more protection than traditional stall warnings, as a pilot must look 
down to see the visual reference. Since these devices are new and widespread adoption 
has not occurred, their effectiveness in preventing LoC events is not well known. 
Highly active, physically installed instrument methods can also be used to prevent 
loss of control. Fly-by-wire (FBW) systems and their computers can consider the 
aircraft’s current flight condition, pilot control inputs, and the normal flight envelope 
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before deciding how to position control surfaces. Such systems can limit or ignore 
dangerous pilot control inputs. “Stick-pusher” systems have also been created for 
mechanically controlled aircraft [10]. These devices consider the flight envelope of the 
aircraft and use a servo motor to resist dangerous pilot input in critical flight conditions. 
While FBW and stick-pusher systems have taken on widespread applications in 
commercial and military aircraft, they are still in development for general aviation. The 
prohibitive cost of FBW systems and relative difficulty of retrofitting will likely deter the 
vast majority of general aviation pilots from installing them in their cockpits.  
 While current methods to prevent LoC do exist, the consistent accident rate in GA 
personal flying and the high percentage of LoC events indicate that warnings could be 
better. For these reasons, it is crucial that more cost-effective methods are developed to 
complement stall warning devices and enhance pilot situational awareness. To be 
valuable, a system must provide more time than traditional warnings to safely react to 
and minimize LoC events. A system that proactively warns pilots of aircraft limitations 
based on the time they have left to react is needed to enhance SA in the cockpit and 
reduce LoC events. 
1.3 Research Motivation and Objective 
The leading cause of accidents and fatalities in general aviation is loss of control 
in flight. By its very definition, LoC is a preventable situation that a pilot can take actions 
to avoid. Unfortunately, it seems that pilots too often do not have the situational 
awareness or perhaps the capability to mitigate situations that are likely to lead to a 
deadly loss of control. With current methods of mitigation, a significant decline in LoC 
events has not been observed in available data. 
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This research addresses the primary cause of fatal general aviation accidents and 
seeks cost-effective means to enhance the pilot’s situational awareness in the early stages 
of potential LoC events. The primary goal of this research is to develop a proof-of-
concept for an active method of warning a pilot of aircraft limitations in flight to 
supplement traditional stall warning systems. This proof-of-concept will be demonstrated 
with a software plugin to X-Plane 10, a commercially available flight simulator used by 
Cessna, Cirrus, NASA, Boeing, and others [11]. In support of the primary goal, this 
research also aims to understand the simulator’s model of a general aviation aircraft and 
compare its calculations to empirical methods. If the simulator mimics the flight 
dynamics of a general aviation aircraft well enough, a warning system developed and 
based upon the simulator’s calculations can demonstrate a proof-of-concept for new 
warning methods. The resulting proof-of-concept would then yield results that should be 
applicable to actual flight in GA aircraft. 
The method demonstrated in this work can use visual and aural warnings and 
potentially adjust its warning margin based on the potential for fatal loss of control. Such 
a system can be integrated into current general aviation aircraft using onboard electronic 
flight information systems (EFIS). For existing aircraft without EFIS, the method can be 
implemented on a standalone system that would lower training and cost barriers to bring 
enhanced situational awareness to a wider audience of pilots, including the growing 
number of experimental or amateur-built aircraft pilots.  
  
 11 
Chapter 2: Flight Simulator Comparison with Empirical Data 
 
 
 
2.1 X-Plane 10 Introduction 
X-Plane 10 is a flight simulator developed by Laminar Research. Much like any 
flight simulator, X-Plane has a “flight model,” which is a mathematical simulation used 
to calculate an aircraft’s flight characteristics. Due to its closed-source nature, little is 
revealed to the general public about X-Plane’s flight model. It is known that X-Plane 10 
does not base its flight model on stability derivative tables. Instead, it uses blade element 
theory [12] to break down aircraft surfaces into small element upon which forces are 
calculated. There is an emphasis on lifting surfaces, such as the wing and horizontal tail, 
while the fuselage and other exposed parts of the aircraft are modeled more crudely. 
Lifting surfaces and the aircraft description are built up in Plane-Maker, an application 
that comes with X-Plane. Figure 5 on the next page shows a Cessna 172 in X-Plane 10 
with lifting vector lines on primary lifting surfaces, including the propeller. 
As a common general aviation plane that has been produced since the 1950s, the 
Cessna 172 is a great example of what the average pilot might fly for personal use. The 
Cessna 172SP (model 172S) aircraft was used as the basis for analysis in this research. X-
Plane 10 is distributed with a model of the Cessna 172SP. Throughout this research, the 
original and modified versions of the Cessna 172 in X-Plane 10.32 were used. 
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Figure 5: Cessna 172SP flying in X-Plane 10 with flight model visualization 
 
Since the accuracy of the flight model and the Cessna 172 included in X-Plane is 
not guaranteed, it is critical to understand and compare the results of the model’s 
calculations to what is expected from empirical data. Without a physically reasonable 
flight model, any warning system developed and tested on the digital flight simulator has 
little merit in pilot training and real-world use. In the following sections, stability and 
performance characteristics of X-Plane 10’s stock Cessna 172SP are compared primarily 
to United States Air Force Stability and Control DATCOM (Data Compendium) methods 
summarized by Roskam [13] and Raymer [14]. DATCOM calculations give stability 
derivatives that describe how the aircraft responds to changes in airflow and control 
surface deflections. Existing data for the Cessna 172’s stability derivatives was not used 
due to geometry differences between X-Plane’s model and the real aircraft. 
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2.2 Aircraft Geometry and Empirical Calculations 
2.2.1 X-Plane Cessna 172SP Model Reference 
The geometric and performance data that constructs the Cessna 172SP is available 
in a digital file that is viewable in the X-Plane companion program called Plane-Maker. 
Plane-Maker takes geometric, airfoil, performance, systems, and other aircraft parameters 
to create an aircraft (.acf) file. X-Plane uses the data that is given in this file to construct 
the aircraft and place it in the flight model each time an aircraft is loaded into X-Plane. 
Unless otherwise noted, the stock (unmodified) version of the Cessna 172SP that is 
included with X-Plane 10.32r1 was used as a reference model for comparison purposes. 
Equivalent wing, horizontal tail, and vertical tail geometry were obtained using the 
graphical methods from Roskam [13] with geometric data from Plane-Maker as 
reference. The creation and usage of equivalent geometry is necessary for empirical-
based formulas (such as DATCOM) that do not handle complicated geometry well. 
2.2.2 Equivalent Wing Geometry 
X-Plane 10 divides lifting surfaces up into separate panels and then calculates the 
forces on each panel separately using blade element theory. This finite breakup allows X-
Plane’s flight model to handle many less calculations for otherwise very complicated 
geometry. For more explanation, see the Figures in Appendix B. 
While this finite element process is convenient for achieving good flight 
characteristics in the X-Plane model, it is not convenient for performing empirical 
calculations to estimate stability derivatives based on geometry. Using the details from 
Plane-Maker and to-scale graphics, equivalent geometry was derived using graphical 
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estimation methods from Roskam’s Chapter 2 [13]. The wing was estimated as a 
trapezoidal shape that preserved X-Plane 10’s values of surface area, aspect ratio, tip 
chord, total span, and approximate leading edge geometry. The results from the process 
are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 6 below. 
Table 2: Equivalent wing geometry summary b  =  39.36  ft   ΛLE  =  3.28˚  S  =  188.6  ft2   Λc/4  =  1.5˚  λ  =  0.602   Λc/2  =  -­‐0.23˚  cr  =  5.98  ft   𝑐!=  4.95  ft  ct  =3.60  ft   A  =  8.214  
 
The mean aerodynamic chord of the wing was calculated using Equation 1 [14]: 
 𝑐! = !! 𝑐! !!!!!!!!!    (1) 
Where 𝜆 is the taper ratio, which is defined by the ratio of the root and tip chord lengths: 
 𝜆 = !!!!   (2) 
 
Figure 6: Equivalent wing geometry (not to scale) 
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It should be noted that the surface area and span of the Cessna 172’s wing in X-
Plane 10 is larger than the actual aircraft [15]. While the exact reason for the discrepancy 
is unknown, the X-Plane focus on lifting surfaces and lack of precise fuselage modeling 
may be involved. Where discrepancies exist between the X-Plane Cessna 172SP and the 
actual aircraft, X-Plane’s values will be used to directly compare the flight model to the 
graphical and empirical calculations.  
2.2.3 Equivalent Empennage Geometry 
Similar to the wing geometry in Section 2.2.2 above, equivalent horizontal and 
vertical tail geometry was derived using X-Plane information and Roskam’s equivalent 
geometry methods [13]. Where needed, to-scale prints were used to derive dimensions 
that were not readily available in Plane-Maker. The horizontal tail was estimated as a 
trapezoidal shape that preserved X-Plane 10’s values of surface area, aspect ratio, tip 
chord, total span, and approximate leading edge geometry. The elevator chord ratio 
(𝑐!/𝑐!") was 0.40. A summary of the process is provided in Table 3 below and Figure 7 
on the following page. 
Table 3: Equivalent horizontal tail geometry summary 𝑏!"   =  11.16  ft   ΛLE  =  7.15˚  𝑆!"   =  20.35  ft2   Λc/4  =  5.00˚  𝜆!"   =  0.623   Λc/2  =  2.84˚  cr  =  4.49  ft   𝑐!"=  3.713  ft  ct  =2.8  ft   𝐴!"   =  6.12  
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Figure 7: Equivalent horizontal tail geometry visualization (not to scale) 
 
The horizontal tail span in X-Plane is actually slightly smaller than the span on the real 
aircraft [15]. However, it does not appear that the gap in the horizontal tail for elevator 
travel is modeled with any accuracy in X-Plane. 
Equivalent vertical tail geometry was also created using graphical methods similar 
to the wing and horizontal tail. Due to the Cessna 172’s large dorsal fin, the vertical tail 
was modeled in two separate pieces in X-Plane (see Figure B-3 in Appendix B). These 
two pieces were combined into one equivalent vertical tail. A summary of the geometry 
results is provided in Table 4 below and Figure 8 on the next page. 
Table 4: Equivalent vertical tail geometry summary 𝑏!"   =  5.59  ft   𝜆!"   =  0.4048  𝑆!"   =  22.79  ft2   Λc/4  =  37.0˚  cr  =  5.81  ft   𝑐!"=  4.321  ft  ct  =2.35  ft   𝐴!"   =  1.37  
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Figure 8: Equivalent vertical tail geometry visualization (not to scale) 
 
2.2.4 Center of Gravity Location 
Other geometric values were taken from the Cessna 172 model in Plane-Maker, 
including the nominal center of gravity location. The center of gravity location, taken 
from the Cessna 172 model in Plane-Maker, is 3 inches aft of the wing quarter-chord at 
the root, which was taken to be 1.0 ft aft of the equivalent wing leading edge. This center 
of gravity location, 𝑥!", was used for all stability derivative calculations and X-Plane 
flight test extractions. 
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2.2.5 Longitudinal Stability Derivatives 
 Basic longitudinal stability derivatives were calculated using equivalent geometry 
and methods from Roskam [13] and Raymer [14]. These parameters are summarized in 
Table 5, with detailed explanations on how they were obtained discussed below.  
Table 5: Summary of empirical-based longitudinal stability derivatives 𝐶!! 𝐶!! 𝐶!!" 𝐶!!" 𝐶!!" 𝐶!!" 
0.0884 -0.0256 0.0151 -0.00394 0.00613 -0.0188 
Note: all terms are in deg-1 
Lift-Curve Slope 
The lift-curve slope (𝐶!!) was estimated using Equation 3 [13]:  
 𝐶!! = 𝐶!!!" + 𝐶!!!𝜂!" !!! 1− !"!"  (3) 
Using the methods described in Roskam [13], 𝐶!!!"and 𝐶!!!were also estimated: 
 𝐶!! = !!"!! !!!!!! !!"#!!!/!!! !!    (4)  
where 𝛽 is a compressibility correction [13]: 
  𝛽 = 1−𝑀!   (5) 
and 𝜅 is the ratio of the 2D airfoil lift curve slope to theory [14]: 
 𝜅 = !ℓ𝓁!!!   𝑜𝑟   !ℓ𝓁!!"#˚  (6) 
Many small general aviation aircraft fly slowly enough that compressibility 
effects can be ignored (i.e. 𝛽 = 1), however a small amount of compressibility effects 
were considered. With a Cessna 172’s cruise speed a little over 100 mph at Sea Level, 𝑀 = 0.15 was used where applicable. 
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 Using Equations 3-6, equivalent wing geometry from Section 2.2.2, and the 
parameters given in Table 6 below, 𝐶!! for the Cessna 172SP was calculated to be 0.0884 
deg-1. 
Table 6: Parameters used for lift-curve slope calculations 
Parameter	   Value Description 𝑆!" 20.35 ft2 Horizontal tail area 𝜂!" 0.9 Horizontal tail dynamic pressure ratio (𝑞!"/𝑞!) assumed with guidance of Roskam [13] and Raymer [14] 𝐶ℓ𝓁!!  0.101 deg-1 NACA 2412 airfoil lift curve slope [16] 𝐶ℓ𝓁!!"  0.100 deg-1 NACA 0006 airfoil lift curve slope [16] 𝜕𝜀𝜕𝛼 0.33 Change in downwash angle with change in angle of attack (calculated with Roskam’s methods [13]) 𝑀 0.15 Nominal Mach Number for Cessna 172S flight 
 
Pitching Moment Curve Slope 
The pitching moment curve slope (𝐶!!) was estimated using Equation 7 [13]: 
 𝐶!! = !"!!"! 𝐶!!  (7) 
The term !"!!"!  is known as the static margin of an aircraft and is given by: 
 !"!!"! = 𝑥!" − 𝑥!"  (8) 
Where (𝑥!" – 𝑥!") is the mean aerodynamic chord (MAC) normalized distance between 
the longitudinal center of gravity and longitudinal location of the neutral point (i.e. the 
aerodynamic center of the aircraft). Normalizing distances with the wing MAC, 𝑐, is 
common notation for the longitudinal axis stability derivatives as shown: 
  𝑥!" = !!"!!      (9) 
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In this work, both 𝑥!" and 𝑥!" are measured from the leading edge of the equivalent 
wing’s root. If the neutral point location is forward of 𝑥!", then the aircraft is unstable. 
The neutral point is calculated by using Roskam’s [13] and Raymer’s [14] methods while 
ignoring thrust effects: 
 𝑥!" = !!!!"!!"!"!!!!!"#!!!!!"!!"!!"! !!"!" !!!"!"!!!!"!!!!!"!!"!!"! !!!"!"   (10) 
A summary of the parameters used in calculating the neutral point location is provided in 
Table 7 below: 
Table 7: Parameters used for calculating neutral point 
Parameter	   Value Description 𝐶!!!"#  0.00437 deg-1 Fuselage increment to change in coefficient of moment with change in angle of attack [14] 𝜂!" 0.9 Horizontal tail dynamic pressure ratio (𝑞!"/𝑞!) 
e 0.8 Oswald efficiency factor 𝑥!"!" 0.357 x-location (rearward positive) of wing, referenced to leading edge of equivalent wing root 𝑥!"!" 3.39 x-location (rearward positive) of horizontal tail’s aerodynamic center, referenced to leading edge of equivalent wing root 𝜕𝜀𝜕𝛼 0.33 Change in downwash angle with change in angle of attack (calculated with Roskam’s methods [13])  
 
The aerodynamic center (AC) of the wing and horizontal tails was placed on the 
quarter-chord line. The Y-distance to the AC was calculated using Equation 11 below 
[14] and the distance to the leading edge of the equivalent geometry wing was measured 
to get 𝑥!!!" and 𝑥!"!". 
 𝑌 = !!   !!!!!!!    (11) 
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Using the processes described above, Equations 7-11, and the equivalent wing 
and horizontal tail geometry, 𝐶!! = -.0244 deg-1. Daniel Raymer [14] suggests that static 
margin will increase with high-wing aircraft designs. With the Cessna 172SP design, the 
static margin (and thus the magnitude of 𝐶!!) may be expected to increase around 6%, 
bringing 𝐶!! to -0.0256 
Flap Term Calculations 
 Lift and moment increments due to flap deflection, 𝐶!!"  and 𝐶!!" , were 
calculated using Equations 12 and 13 and methods from Roskam [13] and Raymer [14]: 
 C!!! = Cℓ𝓁!! !!! !!ℓ𝓁! ! !! !!!! !ℓ𝓁 K! (12) 
 𝐶!!" =   −C!!!(𝑥!" − 𝑥!")  (13) 
A summary of the parameters used in calculating 𝐶!!" and 𝐶!!" is given in Table 8 
below. For direct comparison of the calculated flap coefficient terms available in X-
Plane, calculations were based on an assumed flap deflection (𝛿𝐹) of 40˚. 
Table 8: Parameters used for calculating flap coefficients 
Parameter	   Value Description Cℓ𝓁!! 	   0.0364 (deg-1) Theoretical flap-lift effectiveness [13] C!! !Cℓ𝓁! ! 	   0.800 (deg-1) Ratio of lift curve slope of the unflapped surface to airfoil section lift curve slope, corrected for Mach effects [13] α! !!α! !ℓ𝓁 	   1.04 Ratio of 3D flap effectiveness parameter to 2D flap effectiveness parameter, function of surface aspect ratio and theoretical value of (𝛼!)!ℓ𝓁 [13] K! 0.5 Flap span factor, evaluated at 40˚ [13] 𝑥!" 0.462 Center of pressure of the flap lift increment [14] 
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It should be noted that Roskam’s DATCOM methods assume a sealed gap plain flap [13]. 
Raymer suggests as much as a 15% reduction in terms for non-sealed surfaces [14]. This 
reduction was not applied for the flaps because the Cessna 172 has slotted flaps that 
exhibit a slight Fowler flap motion. The final results of empirical calculations for 𝐶!!" 
and 𝐶!!" were 0.0151 deg-1 and -0.00394 deg-1, respectively. 
Elevator Term Calculations 
Elevator coefficients are calculated in a similar manner to the flap terms above 
using Equations 14 and 15 from Roskam [13]. This is possible because the elevator 
essentially acts as a plain flap on the horizontal tail. 
 C!!! = Cℓ𝓁!! !!! !!ℓ𝓁! ! !! !!!! !ℓ𝓁 K!  (14) 
 𝐶!!" =   −C!!! !!"!   (15) 
A summary of the parameters used in calculating 𝐶!!" and 𝐶!!" is given in Table 9 
below.  
Table 9: Parameters used for calculating elevator coefficients 
Parameter	   Value Description Cℓ𝓁!! 	   0.0744 (deg-1) Theoretical elevator-lift effectiveness [13] C!! !Cℓ𝓁! ! 	   0.7443 Ratio of lift curve slope of unflapped (𝛿𝐸 = 0˚) surface to airfoil section lift curve slope, corrected for Mach effects [13] α! !!α! !ℓ𝓁 	   1.025 Ratio of 3D elevator effectiveness parameter to 2D elevator effectiveness parameter, function of surface aspect ratio and theoretical value of (𝛼!)!ℓ𝓁 [13] K!	   1.0 Elevator span factor [13] 𝑙!" 	   15.2 ft Tail arm (distance between aerodynamic centers of wing and horizontal tail) 
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Since elevator deflections are often used to make smaller adjustments, an assumed 
elevator deflection (𝛿𝐸) of only 10˚ was used. The final results of empirical calculations 
for 𝐶!!" and 𝐶!!" were 0.00613 deg-1 and -0.0188 deg-1, respectively. 
2.2.6 Lateral-Directional Stability Derivatives 
Two lateral-directional stability derivatives were chosen for empirical calculation 
and X-Plane comparison. Lateral-directional static stability is indicated by the aircraft’s 
response to sideslip (𝛽). The yawing moment due to sideslip (𝐶!!) and the rolling 
moment due to sideslip (𝐶ℓ𝓁!) were estimated using Equations 16 and 17 below from 
Raymer [14] and equivalent geometry of the vertical tail and wings. 
 𝐶!! = 𝐶!!! + 𝐶!!!"# + 𝐶!!!"   (16) 
 𝐶ℓ𝓁! = 𝐶ℓ𝓁!! + 𝐶ℓ𝓁!!"   (17) 
The vertical tail provides the largest contribution to lateral-directional stability. 
The vertical tail terms 𝐶!!!"  and 𝐶ℓ𝓁!!"  are given by Equations 18 and 19 below from 
Raymer [14]. 
 𝐶!!!" = 𝐶!!!" !"!"!" 𝜂!" !!"!! 𝑥!"!" − 𝑥!"   (18) 
 𝐶ℓ𝓁!!" = 𝐶!!!" !"!"!" 𝜂! !!"!! 𝑍!"  (19) 
In lateral-directional equations, normalized ("bar") terms are found by dividing the 
dimensional distance by the wingspan: 
 𝑥!"!" = !!"!"!!   (20) 
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Parameters used in the calculation of 𝐶!! and 𝐶ℓ𝓁! are given in Table 10 below. Some 
lateral-directional terms, such as the 𝐶!!!  in Equation 16, are dependent on flight 
condition. Where applicable, these parameters were evaluated at the flight conditions 
most similar to those experienced when extracting sideslip derivatives from X-Plane (see 
Section 2.3.2). 
Table 10: Parameters used for calculating sideslip derivatives 
Parameter	   Value Description 
𝐶!!!" 	   0.0314 (deg-1) Vertical tail lift curve slope 𝜕𝛽!𝜕𝛽 𝜂!" 	   1.245 Vertical tail sideslip derivative times the local dynamic pressure ratio [14] 𝑥!"!" 	   0.4326 Location of vertical tail aerodynamic center, normalized with the wing span, referenced to leading edge of 
equivalent wing 𝑍!" 	   0.0617 Vertical distance from c.g. position to vertical tail aerodynamic center [14] 
 
The final results of empirical calculations for 𝐶!! and 𝐶ℓ𝓁! are given in Table 11 below. 
Table 11: Empirical estimations of lateral-directional sideslip derivatives 𝐶!!   (deg-­‐1) 0.00120 𝐶ℓ𝓁!   (deg-­‐1) -0.00029 
 
The calculated 𝐶!! is very near (but slightly lower) than the value that is given in 
Raymer’s text for a Cessna 182, 0.00131 deg-1. The Cessna 182 is of very similar design 
but slightly larger than the 172. The flight condition in which the Cessna 182 𝐶!! was 
calculated is not known. A different flight condition and slightly different geometry may 
account for the minor discrepancy in values. 
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2.3 Extracted Data from X-Plane 10 Flight Tests 
Data was exported from X-Plane using "Data-Out" in the X-Plane 10 software. A 
screenshot of X-Plane’s Data-Out options is given in Figure 9 below. The Data-Out 
functionality allows a user to export many variables from the Flight Model. For the 
purposes of this research, X-Plane was requested to write variables to a text file at a rate 
of 50 Hz. With X-Plane graphics frames running between 20 and 40 Hz and the flight 
model computing 2-3 times per graphics frame, this requests that X-Plane exports nearly 
every frame. In practice, it is likely that some computed flight model frames could be 
lost. Extremely high resolution of the flight model is not required for this research, so the 
built-in Data-Out functionality was considered adequate. 
 
Figure 9: X-Plane data-out options 
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2.3.1 Longitudinal Flight Test Extractions 
As one of the most basic aerodynamic parameters, the lift curve slope (𝐶!!) for 
the Cessna 172SP was evaluated in X-Plane. The pitching moment curve slope (𝐶!!), 
offers an understanding of the static stability of an aircraft. If a simulator models an 
excessively stable or less stable aircraft, the simulated handling qualities may be 
significantly different than a pilot would expect in real life. Elevator terms 𝐶!!! and 𝐶!!! 
show how the total lift and moment of the aircraft change with elevator deflection. When 
compared to DATCOM results, these terms indicate the elevator’s effectiveness in the 
simulator. These longitudinal coefficients have been extracted from X-Plane because of 
their relevance to the development of a Loss of Control warning system and because they 
offer basic physical comparison of simulated flight model results with empirical data.  
Additionally, flap coefficients were extracted from Plane-Maker. 
Lift Curve Slope 
The change in lift coefficient with respect to angle of attack (𝐶!!) was extracted 
from X-Plane by a smooth sweep of power settings while holding altitude. The aircraft 
was held at 4,000 ft in a calm standard atmosphere. It was initially trimmed for Straight, 
Level, Unaccelerated Flight (SLUF) at approximately 100 KIAS, but no further trim 
adjustments were made. The aircraft’s power setting was slowly increased to maximum 
and then slowly reduced until just before expected stall. A scatter plot of the 
corresponding 𝐶! and 𝛼 pairs is shown in Figure 10 on the following page. 
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Figure 10: Cessna 172 lift curve extraction from X-Plane 10 
 
Near stall the lift curve slope becomes nonlinear, which is typical of a wing’s lift 
curve. Aerodynamic stall begins to occur around and after  𝛼 = 11˚. In forming the 
extracted 𝐶!!, the linear region of the lift curve was considered. This region is found 
below  𝛼 = 8˚ as shown in Figure 10. A linear fit of all values below 𝛼 = 7˚ was selected 
for the extraction of 𝐶!! . The results are presented in Table 12 below. 
Table 12: Extracted lift curve slope parameters 𝐶!!   (deg-­‐1) 0.0804 𝐶!!!!˚ 0.375 
Note: 𝐶!!!!˚ is the coefficient of lift that is generated when 𝛼 = 0˚. 
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Moment Curve Slope 
 The change in longitudinal moment coefficient with respect to angle of attack was 
extracted by observing the aircraft’s response to an instantaneous change in pitch. In X-
Plane, the flight model calculates the angle of attack on different geometry surfaces. 
Changing the aircraft’s angle of attack is most easily accomplished by instantaneously 
changing its pitch. 
To change the pitch in X-Plane, a custom Cessna 172SP cockpit panel and 
software plugin were developed. The cockpit panel modification, as shown in Figure 11 
below, allowed the pilot to choose different changes in rotation about the pitch, roll, and 
heading axes (∆𝜃, ∆𝜙, ∆𝜓), which would be executed by the software plugin when the 
"Execute Change" button was pressed. 
 
Figure 11: Cockpit panel modifications for change in orientation 
 
Execute Change 
+𝜽 
−𝜽 
+𝝓 
−𝝓 
+𝝍 
−𝝍 
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In order to change the pitch angle correctly, the plugin had to consider the 
orientation of the Cessna 172 in X-Plane’s flight model. The aircraft’s orientation, 
including pitch, roll, and heading (𝜃,𝜙,𝜓) is recorded as a quarternion instead of Euler 
Angles or rotation matricies. The quaternion is stored as a four-variable array in the flight 
model, which is described by Equations 21a-d as given from the X-Plane Software 
Development Kit (SDK) [17]: 
 𝑞 0 =    cos𝜓 cos𝜃 cos  (𝜙)+ sin 𝜓 sin 𝜃 sin  (𝜙)  (21a) 
 𝑞 1 =    cos𝜓 cos𝜃 sin 𝜙 − sin 𝜓 sin 𝜃 cos  (𝜙) (21b) 
 𝑞 2 = cos𝜓 sin𝜃 cos 𝜙 + sin 𝜓 cos 𝜃 sin 𝜙  (21c) 
 𝑞 3 =   −cos𝜓 sin𝜃 sin  (𝜙)+ sin 𝜓 cos 𝜃 cos  (𝜙) (21d) 
Each time the plugin was commanded to execute an orientation change, it 
considered the current orientation of the aircraft (𝜃,𝜙,𝜓) and the requested changes 
(𝛥𝜃,𝛥𝜙,𝛥𝜓). It then calculated a new quaternion using Equations 21a-d and changed the 
orientation in the flight model. 
For the purposes of extracting 𝐶!! , only the ∆𝜃  option was used to 
instantaneously change the aircraft’s pitch and thus angle of attack in the flight model. 
The aircraft was held at 100 KIAS in SLUF at 4,000 ft in a calm standard atmosphere. 
When SLUF was established, the aircraft was displaced a designated value in pitch. 
When the aircraft restabilized near the initial altitude, the process was repeated.  
Figure 12 on the following page is a time-history example of a 𝐶!!extraction 
flight test. In this example, a pitch increase of 5˚ was commanded by the plugin, resulting 
in nearly a 5˚ change in angle of attack. 
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Figure 12: Moment curve slope extraction, X-Plane time history 
 
This process was completed 12 times with positive increases in pitch forced upon the 
flight model. The stability derivative 𝐶!!was approximated by using the relation: 
 
!!!!"   =   𝐶!! = !!"!    (22) 
The lowest value of 𝐶! and the highest value of 𝛼 were identified by MATLAB scripts 
and used in Equation 22 above. A linear trend was observed for the extracted 𝐶!! based 
on the commanded magnitudes of 𝛥𝜃 and the resulting flight model 𝛥𝛼. This trend is 
shown in Figure 13 on the following page. 
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Figure 13: Moment curve slope trend with varying changes in angle of attack 
 
Using a linear fit of extracted 𝐶!! data, the intercept of the ordinate was used as 
the expected value for 𝐶!!. A linear fit intercept was used instead of a statistical average 
because stability derivatives are typically considered for a particular equilibrium flight 
condition. In this case, the equilibrium point for SLUF is a 0˚ disturbance in α. The final 
calculated 𝐶!! was  -0.0433 deg-1. 
Elevator Increments to Moment and Lift Coefficients  
The change in lift coefficient with respect to elevator deflection (C!!!) and the 
change in moment coefficient with respect to elevator deflection (C!!!) were extracted 
from X-Plane by observing the aircraft’s response to a step input of elevator deflection. 
The aircraft’s step elevator response, as in control theory, is the dynamic response of the 
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aircraft when the elevator is instantaneously deflected to a certain value (away from the 
trim point). An example time history of this process is shown in Figure 14 below. 
  
Figure 14: Cessna 172SP time response to positive elevator deflection step change 
In the above simulated flight test, the aircraft was manually flown and trimmed 
for SLUF at approximately 4,000 ft in a calm standard atmosphere. The simulator was 
paused and the elevator deflection was changed in the flight model. The simulation was 
then resumed, and the elevator deflection was held constant. For consistency, all stability 
augmentation was turned off and control response was set to completely linear in X-
Plane’s settings. 
Seven aircraft nose down (positive ∆𝛿𝐸) elevator step changes were made. The 
aircraft was reset to its trim state before each step change in elevator. The data was 
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analyzed in MATLAB, where the changes ∆δE, ∆C! , and ∆C!  were identified. The 
details of the flight test results are given in Table 13 below. 
Table 13: X-Plane elevator coefficients extraction data ∆δE 0.857˚ 1.71˚ 2.57˚ 4.29˚ 6.43˚ 8.58˚ 10.3˚ ∆C!∆δE	   0.00811 0.00790 0.00796 0.00897 0.00896 0.00844 0.00881 ∆C!∆δE 	   -0.038 -0.037 -0.037 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 
 
Given the consistency of results for ∆!!∆!! and ∆!!∆!! , the X-Plane results were averaged 
together for all ∆δE. The results are presented in Table 14 below. 
Table 14: Extracted elevator coefficient parameters 𝐶!!!   (deg-­‐1) 0.0085 𝐶!!!   (deg-­‐1) -0.0377 
Flap Coefficients 
The creators of the Cessna 172SP model manually entered certain flap 
coefficients in Plane-Maker. The flap coefficients appear to be for the maximum flap 
deflection allowed in the Cessna 172SP model (40˚). It is assumed, but not fully 
understood, that X-Plane does a coefficient interpolation for non-maximum flap 
deflections. The flap coefficients and other relevant flap parameters are given in Table 15 
below. 
Table 15: X-Plane Cessna 172SP flap parameters for 40˚ deflection 
Flap Chord 26% 
Flap Semi-Span 7.75 ft 𝐶!!  0.914 𝐶!!  0.059 𝐶!!  -0.282 
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2.3.2 Lateral-Directional Flight Test Extractions 
The angle of sideslip derivatives for yawing moment (𝐶!!) and rolling moment 
( 𝐶ℓ𝓁! ) were extracted from X-Plane by observing the aircraft’s response to an 
instantaneous change in heading. These two derivatives were chosen for X-Plane 
extraction because they indicate yaw and roll stability, respectively. The impulse change 
in heading was performed using the custom development cockpit and software plugin for 
flight model changes as described in Section 2.3.1 above. As before, Equations 21a-d 
were utilized to execute the change in the flight model. 
For the purposes of extracting both 𝐶!! and 𝐶ℓ𝓁!, only the 𝛥𝜓 (change in heading) 
functionality was used in the custom cockpit (see Figure 11). The aircraft was trimmed 
and held at 100 KIAS in SLUF at 4,000 ft in a calm standard atmosphere. As with the 
longitudinal extractions, the aircraft was displaced a designated value in heading when 
SLUF was established. After the impulse displacement, a time history was recorded for a 
few seconds, SLUF re-established, and another displacement was performed. 
Figure 15 on the following page is a time-history example of a 𝐶!!  and 𝐶ℓ𝓁! 
extraction flight test. In this example, a heading increase of 4˚ was commanded by the 
plugin, resulting in nearly a 4˚ change in sideslip. 
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Figure 15: Cessna 172SP time response to impulse heading change 
 
Twelve impulse displacements in heading were performed, from 𝛥𝜓 = −2˚ to 𝛥𝜓 = 4˚. The stability derivatives for 𝐶!! and 𝐶ℓ𝓁! were estimated using Equations 23 
and 24:  
 !!!!" = 𝐶!! = !!"#  (23) 
 !!ℓ𝓁!" = 𝐶ℓ𝓁! = ℓ𝓁!"#  (24) 
The data from the impulse changes was analyzed in MATLAB, where 𝛥𝛽, 𝛥𝐶!, and 𝛥𝐶ℓ𝓁 
were identified. The results, averaged for each 𝛥𝜓, are detailed on the next page in Table 
16.  
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Table 16: X-Plane lateral-directional stability derivative extraction details 𝛥𝜓	   -­‐2˚	   -­‐1˚	   1˚	   2˚	   3˚	   4˚	  𝛥𝐶!𝛥𝛽 	   -­‐0.00433	   -­‐0.00433	   -­‐0.00432	   -­‐0.00433	   -­‐0.00432	   -­‐0.00433	  𝛥𝐶ℓ𝓁𝛥𝛽 	   0.00128	   0.00128	   0.00128	   0.00128	   0.00128	   0.00128	  
 
The lateral-directional stability derivative calculations were very consistent, with no clear 
trend in 𝐶!! or 𝐶ℓ𝓁!as the magnitude of the 𝛥𝜓 impulse was changed. These values of 𝐶!! 
or 𝐶ℓ𝓁! are of expected sign and are indicative of the aircraft’s yaw and roll stability.  
Given the consistency of the lateral-directional stability results, they were averaged 
together for all 𝛥𝜓. The final results are presented in Table 17 below. 
Table 17: Final extracted lateral-directional stability parameters 𝐶!!   (deg-­‐1) 0.00432 𝐶ℓ𝓁!   (deg-­‐1) -0.00128 
 
2.4 Data Comparison (X-Plane 10 vs. Empirical) 
2.4.1 Longitudinal Data  
The longitudinal stability derivatives extracted from the Cessna 172 model in X-
Plane 10 compare favorably to empirical calculations. Overall, all parameters are of 
correct sign and order of magnitude. The calculated and extracted longitudinal stability 
derivatives are summarized in Table 18 below.  
Table 18: Longitudinal stability derivatives comparison 
Source 𝑪𝑳𝜶 𝑪𝑴𝜶 𝑪𝑳𝜹𝑭 𝑪𝑴𝜹𝑭 𝑪𝑳𝜹𝑬 𝑪𝑴𝜹𝑬 
Empirical 0.0884 -0.0256 0.0151 -0.00394 0.00613 -0.0188 
X-Plane 0.0804 -0.0433 0.0229 -0.00705 0.00850 -0.0377 
Note: all terms are in deg-1 
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X-Plane’s basic lift curve slope agrees very well with empirical predictions, as 
shown in Figure 16. The pitching moment curve slope, an indicator of aircraft’s stability, 
is significantly more negative (more stable) in X-Plane than in empirical calculations.  
  
Figure 16: X-Plane and empirical lift curve comparison 
 
For the flap increment terms 𝐶!!" and 𝐶!!", X-Plane’s increase in moment and 
lift increments is not surprising. In the empirical calculations, the flaps are treated as 
plain flaps; in real life, the flaps are slotted with some small Fowler motion. The Cessna 
172 model creators may have adjusted the flap coefficient terms based on more accurate 
knowledge of how the aircraft performs. 
 The elevator coefficient increment terms 𝐶!!" and 𝐶!!" show some of the largest 
differences between empirical calculations and X-Plane extractions. The exact cause of 
these differences is not known, but the elevator acts more effectively in X-Plane than 
what the geometry-based calculations would predict. It is speculated that the propeller 
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slipstream (and thus, thrust effects) model in X-Plane may contribute to the increased 
elevator effectiveness. An increase in elevator effectiveness also would increase the 
magnitude of 𝐶!!. Alternatively, the location of the center of gravity could also make the 
aircraft appear more or less stable. If interpreted incorrectly during the equivalent 
geometry process, 𝑥!"  could have both made the aircraft appear less stable and the 
elevator less effective. 
 It should be reiterated that thrust effects were not considered in DATCOM 
calculations, but are presumably modeled in X-Plane’s flight model. With the centerline 
of thrust at the front of the aircraft and below the center of gravity, adding thrust effects 
to the Cessna 172 would be destabilizing (moving the neutral point forward). However, 
since the propeller is in line with the horizontal tail, an increase in dynamic pressure 
could result in 𝜂!" greater than unity, offering a stabilizing effect. The net result of thrust 
effects was not estimated, but it is not expected to fully account for differences between 
empirical estimations and X-Plane flight tests. 
2.4.2 Lateral-Directional Data 
 The lateral-directional derivatives 𝐶!! and 𝐶ℓ𝓁! are presented in Table 19 below. 
Table 19: Lateral-directional stability parameter comparison 
Derivative X-Plane 10 Empirical 𝐶!!   (deg-­‐1) 0.00432 0.00120 𝐶ℓ𝓁!   (deg-­‐1) -0.00128 -0.00029 
 
 
While the differences between the X-Plane extractions and empirical calculations are 
quite large in terms of percentage, all terms are indicative of static lateral-directional 
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stability. The empirical terms are approximately 25% the magnitude of the X-Plane 
derivatives. Since the vertical tail is the primary contributor in these sideslip derivatives, 
this difference may indicate that X-Plane may be treating the vertical tail as more 
effective than would be expected. This is not all that surprising, however, given the way 
that X-Plane’s vertical tail is constructed in the flight model - including a nearly 50% 
increase in surface area when compared to equivalent geometry methods. As mentioned 
in Section 2.2.6, Daniel Raymer estimates the 𝐶!! value of a Cessna 182 as 0.0013 deg-1. 
This value is only 8% more than the estimated 𝐶!! that was derived from calculations 
based on equivalent geometry of a Cessna 172. Given this information, it appears that the 
tail surfaces, both horizontal and vertical, are more effective in X-Plane than in real life. 
The most important aspect, however, is the yaw and roll stability that the aircraft exhibits 
in X-Plane’s flight model.  
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Chapter 3: Warning System Development 
 
 
 
3.1 Warning System Philosophy 
This research set out to design a warning system that gave a pilot a constant-time 
warning. Other warning systems use margins such as airspeed and angle of attack (AoA), 
but do not directly consider the amount of time left before a loss of control event occurs. 
Indirectly, these methods could increase their time margin by increasing their physical 
margin. However, increasing the physical margin may result in unnecessary and 
distracting warnings. 
As an example, consider a pilot approaching stall with a traditional stall horn 
warning system. In practice, the stall horn warning system is based off of the aircraft’s 
angle of attack. If a pilot reduces power in straight-and-level flight while holding altitude, 
the approach to the critical AoA can be relatively slow. However, if a pilot is already near 
the warning threshold and makes a sharp turn toward final approach of a runway, an 
increase in load factor may quickly put him into an accelerated stall. The time between 
hearing the warning and the aircraft actually entering stall can be drastically different in 
these two cases. Increasing the AoA margin may result in distracting and unnecessary 
warnings in the first case, but potentially lifesaving reaction time in the second. 
An electronic warning system that considers the physical state of an aircraft may 
be able to account for how quickly the aircraft is approaching an LoC event. The system 
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would then be able to issue a warning to the pilot based on how much time it expects the 
pilot will have left to take preventative action. The warning time threshold, 𝑡!"#$, could 
be changed when an optimum amount of warning time is found. The logic behind issuing 
an LoC warning would answer the question: "If the aircraft continues to do what it is 
doing now, in 𝑡!"#$ seconds, is there great potential that the pilot could lose control of 
the aircraft?" The fundamental methods of such a warning system are explored in the 
following sections as a proof-of-concept.  
3.2 Warning System Technique 
A simple kinematic equation was used as the basis of the warning system: 
 𝑥 = 𝑥! + !"!" 𝑡 + !! !!!!!! (𝑡!)  (25) 
A similar equation could be found in any elementary physics textbook, where the 
constant acceleration, one-dimensional motion of an object is described by initial position 
(x0), velocity (v), acceleration (a), and position (x) at some time (t): 
 𝑥 = 𝑥! + 𝑣𝑡 + !! 𝑎𝑡!  (26) 
Fortunately, "𝑥" could be replaced by any aircraft state parameter. A few suggested 
parameters are explored in the following sections. 
An electronic warning system, if properly equipped, would know the current state (𝑥!) of some parameter 𝑥. With a time history of an aircraft state parameter, the system 
could calculate the first derivative ("velocity" or rate of change) of the parameter, as well 
as the second derivative ("acceleration") and have a second-order prediction of where 𝑥 
will be after some time 𝑡!"#$. If that prediction exceeds some maximum (or minimum) 
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threshold value 𝑥!"#, then a warning would be issued. This concept is illustrated with 
Equation 27 below. 
 𝑥! + !"!" 𝑡!"#$ + !! !!!!!! 𝑡!"#$! ≥ 𝑥!"#  (27) 
It is stressed that this is only one approach and implementation of a warning 
system. Other methods of prediction and estimation could be used to produce loss of 
control warnings. The author originally attempted to use a first-order prediction method, 
but it yielded unsatisfactory results (false warnings and unsatisfactory warning times). 
Certainly, higher-order estimations of the aircraft’s motion could be used, but at the 
increased cost of practicality and computation time. A balance of prediction complexity 
and computation time must be used to develop a practical warning system. 
3.3 Longitudinal Warnings 
3.3.1 Coefficient of Lift 
A potential for severe loss of control occurs when an aircraft stalls. A stall occurs 
when the aircraft’s wing(s) exceed a certain angle of attack (𝛼) called the critical angle of 
attack (𝛼!"#$ ).  Corresponding with 𝛼!"#$ , 𝐶!!"#  is the maximum lift coefficient 
attainable. Figure 17 on the following page is an example of the relationship between 𝛼 
and 𝐶!. Beyond 𝛼!"#$, the aircraft quickly loses lift (𝐶! decreases) with increasing 𝛼. If 
one wing of the aircraft stalls before the other (such as in an uncoordinated turn at low 
speed), the quick yawing and rolling moment can encourage the aircraft to enter an 
aerodynamic spin. In order to prevent stalls and spins, information about the aircraft’s 
angle of attack or its corresponding lift coefficient must be known. 
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Figure 17: XFOIL lift curve for the NACA 2412 airfoil 
 
An aircraft’s lift coefficient, 𝐶!, is given by the standard lift equation: 
 𝐿 = !! 𝜌𝑣!! 𝑆𝐶!  (28) 
This equation can be simplified by defining dynamic pressure (𝑞!) as: 
 𝑞! = !! 𝜌𝑣!!   (29) 
Which results in a new expression for 𝐶!: 
 𝐶! = !!!!   (30) 
When an aircraft is in SLUF, the total lift being generated is equal to weight. When the 
aircraft is in accelerated flight, the lift being generated can be expressed as a load factor, 𝑛, times the weight of the aircraft: 
 𝐿 = 𝑛𝑊 (31) 
Thus, 𝐶! can be expressed as: 
 𝐶! = !"!"   (32) 
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Equation 32 on the previous page is the basis of the X-Plane implementation as described 
in this work. This simple expression of 𝐶!  makes it attractive for warning system 
implementation because of the relatively few and uncomplicated sensors it requires to 
estimate the 𝐶! of the aircraft in real time. A pitot tube, already used on aircraft to 
determine airspeed, could provide dynamic pressure. Load factor can be easily obtained 
in flight with an inertial measurement unit (IMU). Weight could be estimated using an 
initial weight before takeoff and then an average fuel burn of the aircraft. 
While the lift coefficient was selected as the basis for stall-type warnings in this 
research, by no means is the constant-time warning philosophy tied to a specific 
parameter. It is stressed that other finite difference methods and parameters could be 
pursued. In a more refined version of the warning system, angle of attack information 
could be used. Eugene Morelli [18] discusses more robust ways of determining the angle 
of attack and sideslip with airspeed, angular rates, and translational acceleration; all of 
these are obtainable with a pitot tube and IMU.  
3.3.2 Load Factor 
Pilots can find the load limits of an aircraft in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook of 
the aircraft they are flying, but few general aviation aircraft actually include a g-load 
sensor that the pilot can observe. For the Cessna 172S with flaps up, the POH Normal 
Category load limits are +3.58g, -1.52g [15]. While the pilot can know the limit for the 
aircraft, this knowledge does very little good unless it can be used in flight. A g-load 
warning could be developed with the same concepts as the 𝐶! rate of change warnings 
discussed in the previous section.  
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Although a pilot is not likely to meet or exceed the flight load factor limits as 
listed in the POH in a routine smooth flight, an advanced warning would certainly be 
helpful in the event that the limits are approached. Flight load limits may be more likely 
to be approached in turbulence. In this case, an active warning system may keep a pilot 
away from imminent structural failure. In the event that a pilot’s control inputs directly 
caused load factor exceedance and structural failure resulted, it might be said the pilot 
should have maintained proper control of the aircraft within its normal flight envelope; 
this would be considered an LoC event. 
3.3.3 Airspeed 
Airspeed warnings in general aviation generally focus on stall prevention and thus 
the lower end of an aircraft’s speed capability. An aircraft also has an upper airspeed 
limit due to structural limitations, often referred to as VNE or the “never exceed” airspeed. 
While many GA aircraft often have a visual indication on the airspeed indicator (see 
Figure 18 below), there is not necessarily any other aural or visual warning. 
 
Figure 18: Airspeed indicator from Cessna 172 cockpit 
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If airspeed is a known parameter, the active warning system and state prediction 
technique discussed in Section 3.2 would be able to estimate if the aircraft would exceed 
the “never exceed” (VNE) speed within the given time 𝑡!"#$. It can be argued that a pilot 
rarely nears such a velocity, but some emergencies, such as an in-flight engine fire, call 
for a rapid dive to increase airspeed [15]. In such an event, the warning system may 
prevent a pilot from turning a bad situation into something more deadly. 
3.4 Lateral-Directional Warnings 
3.4.1 Bank Angle 
For most small general aviation aircraft flight, the maximum legal bank angle is 
considered 60 degrees, unless each occupant is wearing an approved parachuting device 
[19]. A bank angle warning from an active warning system would potentially warn a pilot 
when they are about to enter acrobatic flight. Bank angle itself need not be dangerous 
unless the aircraft has some sort of known operating limitation. Nonetheless, if the 
warning system uses an inertial measurement unit, it may be readily capable to estimate 
and issue warnings based on the aircraft’s bank angle and roll rate.  
3.4.2 Sideslip 
 The angle of sideslip (𝛽) of an aircraft is as important to the lateral-directional 
axes as angle of attack is to longitudinal. While it is possible to estimate the sideslip of an 
aircraft, such as given by Morelli [18], the topic is beyond the scope of this research. An 
active warning system could warn of high 𝛽 angles to avoid excessive forces on the 
aircraft’s vertical tail, but such warnings may be unwarranted and distracting to a pilot 
executing forward slip maneuvers for landing. 
 47 
 A more practical application of sideslip knowledge might be to increase the 
warning margin (𝑡!"#$). If an aircraft is approaching stall (𝐶!!"# ,𝛼!"#$) and is flying with 
a significant 𝛽, it is more likely to enter a spin. The knowledge of 𝛽 could be used to give 
the pilot a more advanced warning (e.g. increased 𝑡!"#$) due to the extremely dangerous 
nature of spins. 
3.5 X-Plane Plugin Development 
The coefficient of lift warning was implemented by creating an X-Plane 10 
software plugin. The X-Plane SDK 2.1.3 [20] library was used as an interface to 
communicate with the proprietary X-Plane 10 flight and graphics model. The code for the 
warning system plugin was written in the C programming language for compatibility with 
X-Plane and the X-Plane SDK. The plugin interfaced with a customized Cessna 172SP 
model that displayed warnings to the “pilot” through a modified cockpit panel. 
Plugins in X-Plane run at the mercy of the flight model. Each time a flight model 
“frame” is calculated, the warning system plugin was called. When activated, the plugin 
would store the most recent flight data (“real time”) and perform calculations and logical 
evaluations that determined when a warning would be issued. The plugin is capable of 
storing a user-set amount of historical frames in memory. This historical data is used for 
calculations that determine when a warning should be issued. A simplified explanation of 
this process is shown in Figure 19 below. 
 
Figure 19: Warning system process 
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 48 
3.5.1 Method of Communicating Warning 
For testing and development purposes, the standard cockpit panel was modified to 
include a visual warning indicator as shown in Figure 20 below. 
 
Figure 20: Modified cockpit used in warning system development 
 
Item 1, the two rows of number displays, was used to debug the warning system. 
Variables that needed to be seen for debugging purposes were displayed in the top row if 
they were float values and bottom row if they were integers. Item 2 was the visual custom 
warning alert. It turned bright red as shown in Figure 20 above, and had a darker “off” 
setting as shown in Figure 21 on the following page. Item 3 was X-Plane’s built-in stall 
warning, which alerted the user when the aircraft’s 𝛼 was greater than 10˚. A visual 
warning (Item 2, Figure 20) was issued to the custom cockpit panel when the real-time 
calculations of the warning system indicated an alert was required. The warning request 
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was sent to the cockpit by changing the value of a discrete variable from 0 to 1. This 
variable was capable of being output by X-Plane so it was directly comparable to the 
results from the built-in stall warning.  
 
Figure 21: Modified cockpit with warning system off 
3.5.2 Calculations 
Finite difference methods were employed to find the first and second derivatives 
of the Coefficient of Lift with respect to time in X-Plane. For the purposes of this 
discussion, assume that 𝐶! of the aircraft is directly available in X-Plane 10 and no 
calculations, such as Equation 32 need to be performed. Based on Equation 27 (Section 
3.2), the equation below was used to predict the aircraft’s 𝐶! after 𝑡!"#$ seconds. A 
warning was issued when it was predicted that 𝐶! was greater than the 𝐶!!"#$. 
 𝐶!!" + !!!!" 𝑡!"#$ + !! !!!!!!! 𝑡!"#$! ≥ 𝐶!!"#$  (33) 
In the above equation, 𝐶!!" is the "real-time" estimated coefficient of lift. A warning was 
also issued if at any time the estimated 𝐶!!" was greater than 𝐶!!"#$. 
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When estimating the derivatives with finite difference methods, nonuniform 
spacing in time was assumed. X-Plane 10 calculates computational and graphics frames 
as fast as the computer hardware allows. The time that elapses between each frame is not 
necessarily constant, so assuming a constant change in time (𝛥𝑡) from frame to frame 
would result in less accurate estimations of the derivatives. 
First Derivative Method  
For calculating !!!!" , a Lagrange polynomial was used to find a three-point 
backwards difference (nonuniform spacing) approximation of the second derivative. The 
original Lagrange polynomial was found using the methods described in Gilat & 
Subramanium’s text [21]: 
 𝐶! 𝑡 = !!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!!   +    !!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!! +    !!!! !!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)𝐶!!    (34) 
If the first derivative (i.e. !!!!" ) is found and evaluated at 𝑥!, the three-point backward 
difference for general spacing is given by Equation 35: 
 𝐶!′ 𝑡! =    !!!!!!!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!! +    !!!!!!!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!! +      !!!!!!!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)𝐶!!  (35) 
where  𝐶!! =   𝐶!!"  (real-time 𝐶!)   𝐶!!,𝐶!! = time history values of 𝐶! 𝑡! = current simulator time 𝑡!, 𝑡! = recorded simulator times corresponding to   𝐶!!,𝐶!! 
Because of X-Plane’s inherently discrete calculation model, smoother results in the first 
derivative calculations can be achieved by considering more than the last three frames in 
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the simulation. The averaging and weighting process employed for the first derivative is 
the same as the second derivative method below, but with three terms instead of four. 
Second Derivative Method 
 For calculating !!!!!!! , a Lagrange polynomial was used to find a four-point 
backwards difference (nonuniform spacing) approximation of the second derivative. The 
original Lagrange polynomial was found using the methods described in Gilat & 
Subramanium’s text [21]: 
 𝐶! 𝑡 = !!!! !!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!!   +    !!!! !!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!! (36) 
 +    !!!! !!!! !!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)(!!!!!)𝐶!!   +    !!!! !!!! !!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)(!!!!!)𝐶!!  
If the second derivative (i.e. !!!(!)!!! ) is found and evaluated at 𝑥!, the four-point backward 
difference for general spacing is given by Equation 37: 
 𝐶!!! !! =    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!! +    (37) 
    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! 𝐶!! +      !!!!!!!!!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)(!!!!!)𝐶!! +    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)(!!!!!)𝐶!!  
where  𝐶!! =   𝐶!!"  (real-time 𝐶!) 𝐶!!,𝐶!!,𝐶!! = time history values of 𝐶! 𝑡! = current simulator time 𝑡!, 𝑡!, 𝑡! = recorded simulator times corresponding to 𝐶!!,𝐶!!,𝐶!! 
Because of X-Plane’s inherently discrete calculation model (see Section 3.6.4), smoother 
results in acceleration calculations can be achieved by considering more than the last four 
frames in the simulation. By averaging a number (N) of 𝐶! data points and weighting the 
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values based on the time elapsed in the simulator frame(s), 4xN data points can be 
considered. Using this method, 𝐶!! would be a time-weighted average of the most recent 
data point and the N-1 previous points. 𝐶!! would be a time-weighted average of the 
(N+1) frame to (2N-1). This pattern continues until 4xN frames have been considered for 
the second derivative approximation. For a more graphical illustration of this process, see 
Figure 22 below, where N=3 is used for the evaluation of 12 recorded 𝐶! values. 
 
Figure 22: Explanation of averaging for parameter estimation 
 
In the above Figure 22, 𝐶!! corresponds to the real-time 𝐶!!" as described in Equation 33 
and the parameters 𝐶!!,𝐶!!,𝐶!! are the historical data points. 
While hypothetically a large number of data points could be considered to 
determine acceleration, the fewer data points used, the closer the estimation should be to 
the real-time acceleration. Thus, a balance must be struck between data quality 
("smoothness") and data timeliness. A large set of sample points may offer an accurate 
average acceleration over a time set of 4 or 5 seconds, but the calculated acceleration 
would not be current enough to issue a time-sensitive warning. Because of this, the 
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number of frames being considered for any finite difference calculation should depend on 
the time spacing between data points and how quickly the hardware is able to process the 
calculations. 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 System Setup 
X-Plane 10.32 was executed on an Apple MacBook Pro with Mac OS X 10.10, a 
2.3 GHz Intel® Core i7™, 16 GB RAM, and an NVIDIA® GeForce GT 750 2GB 
graphics card.  Graphical frames were calculated at 20-40 frames per second, with 30 
frames per second being typical. X-Plane 10’s Flight Model calculations were set to 
calculate twice per graphics frame, but software plugins can only run in sync with 
graphical frames. Thus, it was indirectly possible for X-Plane to render frames faster or 
slower based on how many graphics options were turned on. 
The warning system plugin was set to use a 𝐶!!"#$ of 1.08. For data comparison 
purposes, this 𝐶!!"#$ approximately corresponds to the 𝛼!"#$ = 10˚ for the stall horn in 
X-Plane’s Cessna 172SP model. The first and second derivatives were set to use the last 9 
and 8 frames for calculations (see Figure 22). The warning margin, 𝑡!"#$, was set to 2.2 
seconds with an expected efficacy of 2.0 seconds of warning before loss of control due to 
error-checking processes used to prevent false warnings. While 𝑡!"#$ could be set to any 
value, 2.2 seconds yielded acceptable results in testing. Further study should be 
considered to determine optimum time for a pilot to respond to a loss of control event. 
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3.6.2 Pull Up from Straight and Level Flight 
To demonstrate the fundamentals of the 𝐶! -based "constant-time" warning 
system, flight tests were performed in X-Plane. The Cessna 172SP was trimmed in SLUF 
at approximately 2,000 ft MSL and 80 KIAS. While targeting wings-level flight, the 
control yoke was pulled back until at least the beginning of a stall. Two types of flight 
tests, one with a slower and the other a more rapid pull on the control yoke, were 
performed for data analysis.  
 For the first type flight test, the control yoke was pulled back slowly from SLUF 
trimmed state until stall occurred. A time history of 𝛼, 𝐶!, and the activation of the built-
in stall warning and the new plugin-based warning system is show in Figure 23 below.  
 
Figure 23: Time history of slow SLUF pull up warning test 
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For a more complete time history that includes other aircraft state terms, see Figure C-1 
in Appendix C. In Figure 23, the warning system plot indicates whether or not a warning 
was being issued (a value of 1) or was not being issued (a value of 0). The warning that 
begins at about 6.5 seconds is a false warning and is ignored for this discussion (see 
Section 3.6.4). 
For this slow pull up from SLUF, the new warning system activates 0.43 seconds 
before the built-in stall warning of 𝛼!"#$ = 10˚ and about 2.5 seconds before stall. For 
the purposes of this discussion, stall occurs where an increase in 𝛼 no longer shows an 
increase in 𝐶!. While the system is meeting an expected warning margin (𝑡!"#$) of 2.0 
seconds before stall, it technically was set up to issue a warning 𝑡!"#$ seconds before 𝐶!!"#$ was reached. Therefore, while an improvement is shown when compared to the 
built-in stall warning, the new "constant-time" warning system did not offer quite as 
much warning as expected for a slow pull up from SLUF. Slightly more favorable results 
are seen in Figure 24 on the following page, a time history of a more rapid pull up from 
SLUF conditions. For a more complete time history with additional parameters, see 
Figure C-2 in Appendix C.  
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Figure 24: Time history of fast SLUF pull up warning test 
 
For this quick pull up from SLUF, the new warning system activates 1.15 seconds 
before the built-in stall warning of 𝛼!"#$ = 10˚ and about 2.3 seconds before stall. 
Again, the system is meeting the expected 𝑡!"#$ before stall, but not quite giving as 
advanced of a warning as expected. Nonetheless, a clear improvement is shown when 
compared to the built-in stall warning system. 
Also interesting to note is the near-constant warning activation during the 
attempted recovery from stall. Considering the shape of the 𝐶! curve post-stall, it is 
reasonable that the warning system might expect the predicted 𝐶! after 𝑡!"#$ seconds to 
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be at or above 𝐶!!"#$. This is because after pushing the nose down for recovery from the 
stall, the angle of attack is then rapidly increased at least twice. 
3.6.3 "Turn to Final" Simulation 
In a more practical application, the 𝐶!-based "constant-time" warning system was 
flight-tested on a simulated "Turn to Final." Typically, at this stage of flight, the flaps and 
gear are extended while the aircraft makes a turn to final approach of the runway. In 
attempt to line up with the runway, the pilot may pull on the control column in an attempt 
to maintain altitude and tighten the turn. It is a very high-workload situation in flight, so 
an active warning system can be very useful for keeping the pilot away from Loss of 
Control. 
To simulate a turn to final approach, the aircraft was trimmed in SLUF (flaps up) 
at approximately 2,000 ft MSL and 80 KIAS. Throttle was then reduced to initiate a 
descent. Although the speed and flaps up configuration are not exactly what one might 
expect for an approach to landing in a Cessna 172, emergency conditions may preclude 
flap usage. With a steady descent established, the aircraft was rolled to the left and the 
yoke was pulled to increase load factor. Zero sideslip and 45˚ left bank were targeted 
during the maneuver. Figure 25 on the next page shows the time history of one such 
recorded maneuver. For a more complete time history with additional parameters, see 
Figure C-3 in Appendix C. 
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Figure 25: Time history of "Turn to Final" warning test 
 
 For this simulated turn to final, the new warning system activates 0.83 seconds 
before the built-in stall warning and 2 seconds before stall. As expected, banked turns 
with increased load factor are no hindrance to the warning system’s 𝐶!-based operation. 
Again in the above figure, the new warning system issues alerts during the rapid 𝛼 
changes during the recovery from the stall. While such operation could be considered a 
"false warning," it could also be a quite useful improvement in preventing secondary 
stalls. 
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3.6.4 False Warnings 
X-Plane 10 uses an inherently discrete mathematical model of continuous-time 
physics. Because of its inherently discrete calculations, frame-to-frame changes 
sometimes appear larger and more dramatic than they would in a continuous time curve. 
Conversely, if an aircraft is relatively in SLUF, extremely tiny changes in a variable that 
has been relatively steady can occasionally result in a higher than expected calculated 
rate of change. Both of these situations can cause false warnings in the X-Plane based 
plugin warning system, so error-checking has been included in plugin source code. The 
error-checking and debugging techniques, which were implemented during the data 
collection process, include: 
1. Only begin issue a warning if the calculations from the last four frames  
(approximately 0.15 seconds) have indicated a warning was needed. 
2. Do not begin to issue a warning if the current 𝐶! is less than one-half the 
maximum value. 
3. Keep the cockpit warning light on for at least 1 second after the last 
command to issue a warning to the cockpit (makes false warnings visually 
easier to identify). 
Although false warnings occasionally are still present (especially with very rapid 
accelerations/turbulence), the quality of the warnings has improved. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
 
4.1 Thoughts on Practical Implementation 
 The warning system methods described in this work have potential for cost-
effective implementation into existing and future small GA aircraft. Many newer aircraft 
have Electronic Flight Instrument Systems with digital displays. These EFIS (Glass 
Cockpits) offer a vast array of information that could be used in an active constant-time 
warning system. With aircraft physical state and configuration information already 
available in a digital format, the implementation of an active warning system would be as 
simple as writing compatible source code similar to that demonstrated in this research. 
The warning system would be completed with aural and visual warnings installed in the 
cockpit. 
 For older aircraft, the cost and relative ease of installation of the proposed 
warning system would depend on the complexity of the system. For instance, a system 
that adjusts warning parameters based on aircraft configuration would need to know the 
position of the gear and flaps – information that is likely not in a digital format. At a 
minimum, the proposed warning methods would require a digital hardware package 
complete with sensors, processor, aural/visual warning alerts, and a power source.  
It is the author’s opinion that a simpler 𝐶! or 𝛼 based warning system would be 
most successful for implementation in older analog-cockpit aircraft. A system with more 
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warning features (complexity) would have more success in current EFIS-equipped 
aircraft. Regardless of the exact implementation, the nonuniform spacing finite difference 
methods employed in the X-Plane plugin apply well to real hardware usage. With precise 
real-time clock hardware, the code would be able to adapt for changes in runtime 
between loops. 
For any aircraft, the limiting parameters of the system (such as 𝐶!!"# and 𝑉!") 
must be customized to the aircraft’s flight characteristics. Extensive flight testing and 
evaluation should be performed before it would be considered "flight-ready."  
4.2 Conclusions 
4.2.1 X-Plane Flight Model 
The X-Plane Cessna 172 flight model compares favorably with empirical 
calculations of flight characteristics. In longitudinal and lateral-directional cases, the data 
extractions from X-Plane indicate a higher degree of static stability than the actual 
aircraft is expected to possess. It is speculated that X-Plane may model airflow in a way 
that increases the effectiveness of empennage surfaces beyond their expected capabilities. 
Since equivalent geometry and empirical formulae were used to estimate the 
performance, errors should be expected from this process. Using actual Cessna 172 flight 
test time history data could offer improved comparisons. Unfortunately, using real flight 
test data for the development of a new warning system method would greatly increase the 
cost, especially if each aircraft would need a full flight test evaluation before installation. 
Despite the minor differences between X-Plane and empirical calculations, X-
Plane’s flight model is considered acceptable for the development of an active warning 
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system. Static stability characteristics are of expected sign and magnitude and offer a 
realistic flight experience in the simulator. When using X-Plane for warning system 
development, results that are comparable to real-world flight dynamics are expected. 
4.2.2 Warning Method 
 The foundation of a constant-time warning system has been created using a flight 
simulator that has been customized with software plugins and modified cockpit panels. 
As demonstrated in this proof of concept, the constant-time warning system considers the 
aircraft’s current state of the lift coefficient and predicts whether a loss of control event 
(exceeding the maximum lift coefficient) is likely to occur within a time warning margin. 
Significant warning time improvements (more than one second) to X-Plane’s built-in 
angle of attack stall warning have been observed, but a consistent “constant-time” 
warning has not yet been achieved. In practice, the best improvements come from rapid 
approaches to Loss of Control events, where existing physical margins may not provide 
enough time for the pilot to react safely. 
 The potential effects of an improved LoC warning method are noteworthy, as 
Loss of Control is the single largest contributor to GA accidents and fatalities. The 
constant-time warning method should be extended to include other flight parameters to 
improve its LoC event recognition and reduce false warnings. Additionally, the system 
could be programmed to adjust its time warning margin based on the severity of the 
expected LoC event (e.g. a stall at high sideslip is more likely to lead to a spin, so 
additional warning margin could be used). 
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4.3 Future Work 
The successful results of the X-Plane Flight Model Cessna 172SP comparison to 
empirical data encourage the continued development of improved Loss of Control 
warning systems on X-Plane 10. The stall warning concepts that were applied in the 𝐶! 
implementation should be extended to other flight envelope excursions, such as the 
parameters given in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, using rate of change and finite difference 
methods as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.5.2. Overspeed, load factor, and bank angle 
warnings may prove to be useful to a general aviation pilot.  
For further refinement, many flight conditions should be evaluated and the 
warning system should compensate for the aircraft’s configuration. Additional sensors 
would be needed for configuration parameters such as flap extension, and gear position. 
With such added capability, warnings could then be issued for gear and flap overspeed, 
and warnings based on 𝛼  and 𝐶!  would better adjust for landing and takeoff 
configurations. 
A stated goal of this research was to provide better LoC warnings that would not 
require the pilot to be looking inside the cockpit. Additional warnings, including 
enhanced visual and aural warnings, could be added to the simulated cockpit panel in X-
Plane. It is not assumed that the simulated warning light in Figure 20 is not a sufficient 
notification. Enhanced aural warnings would be able to warn a pilot not just of a potential 
loss of control, but also hint of what is causing the alarm. For example, a warning system 
might say "Push Forward!" to lower the nose in the case of excessive angle of attack or 
positive load factor. 
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After a complete set of warning features have been thoroughly tested and 
debugged in X-Plane, the opinion of general aviation pilots (especially flight instructors 
and private pilots) should be sought. Pilot opinions and evaluation of the warning system 
would provide needed feedback before the warning system is transferred to physical 
hardware for flight evaluation. Additionally, multiple piloted test flights on the simulator 
would be useful in determining a warning time margin required for loss of control 
prevention. 
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Appendix A: Additional General Aviation Statistics 
 
 
 
Table A-1: Detailed NTSB general aviation accident data from calendar year 2012 [2] 
General	  Aviation	  Accident	  Aircraft	  by	  Flight	  Purpose	  and	  Aircraft	  Category,	  2012	  
Purpose	  of	  Flight	   Fixed-­‐	  Wing	   Helicopter	   Glider	   Balloon	   Other	   Unknown	   Total	  
Personal	   887	   44	   23	   5	   29	   0	   988	  
Instructional	   172	   29	   6	   0	   1	   0	   208	  
Aerial	  Application	   53	   14	   0	   0	   0	   0	   67	  
Business	   22	   7	   0	   1	   0	   1	   31	  
Positioning	   21	   10	   0	   0	   0	   0	   31	  
Public	  Use	   11	   14	   0	   0	   0	   0	   25	  
Other	  Work	  Use	   8	   8	   0	   8	   0	   0	   24	  
Aerial	  Observation	   11	   7	   0	   0	   0	   0	   18	  
Flight	  Test	   11	   2	   0	   0	   3	   1	   17	  
External	  Load	   0	   12	   0	   0	   0	   0	   12	  
Executive/Corporate	   7	   4	   0	   0	   0	   0	   11	  
Ferry	   8	   3	   0	   0	   0	   0	   11	  
Skydiving	   10	   0	   0	   1	   0	   0	   11	  
Banner	  Tow	   7	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   7	  
Air	  Race/Show	   6	   0	   0	   1	   0	   0	   7	  
Glider	  Tow	   1	   0	   1	   0	   0	   0	   2	  
Air	  Drop	   2	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   2	  
Fire	  Fighting	   0	   1	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	  
Unknown	   13	   0	   0	   0	   0	   1	   14	  
Total	   1250	   155	   30	   16	   33	   3	   1487	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Figure A-1: Full defining event data for personal flying accidents in 2012 [2] 
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Appendix B: X-Plane Wing Model 
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Figure B-1: X-Plane wing model details 
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Figure B-2: X-Plane horizontal tail model details 
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Figure B-3: X-Plane vertical tail model details
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Warning System Data 
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